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Statement of objectives for this paper 
In this paper I shall be concerned with the method Aristotle 
uses in the inquiry into the nature of happiness in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Through analysis of some of the method's features, it will 
be seen that labelling it "the onion approach to developing and 
fleshing out a hypothesis" will be appropriate. I shall show how 
Aristotle derives a set of necessary conditions and a set of other 
criteria, or reliable indicators, which any adequate account of the 
nature of happiness must meet. There are definite benefits to un-
derstanding the strategy in these terms. Having derived a set of 
criteria which an adequate account must fulfill, we are in a posi-
tion to examine which of the two rival hypotheses about the nature 
of happiness best satisfies the criteria. The life of theoretical study 
emerges as the clear winner at meeting the criteria Aristotle him-
self imposes on an adequate account. 
Aristotle's ethical method: an overview of the onion approach 
Aristotle might not appear, prima facie, to have any terribly 
systematic method in The Nicomachean Ethics (henceforth NE). 1 
Ethics not being a science, it cannot have an exact method, or so he 
continually maintains. Nevertheless, for all his protestations, there 
is a discernible pattern to the inquiry which I shall examine and 
baptize as "the onion approach to developing and fleshing out a 
hypothesis." The onion approach proceeds roughly as follows: 
(1) Aristotle starts by collecting data concerning the nature of 
happiness (the central subject under inquiry in the NE) and 
human nature. 
1 The version of the Nicomachean Ethics I have used is the translation by Terence 
Irwin (Indiana: Hackett, 1985). 
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(2) Through careful exegesis of the data, he then attempts to 
discern the kernel of truth embedded in the data in order to 
get to a first principle. (He argues that the way of sorting 
through the data enjoys a claim to epistemological superi-
ority.) 
(3) From the findings of step (2), he compiles a list of require-
ments, or necessary conditions, an adequate account of hap-
piness must fulfill. 
(4) He then tests the view as so far developed against fresh 
data. This testing yields new insights about the hypothesis 
developed. 
(5) These new insights suggest other conditions which should 
be satisfied by an adequate view. These new conditions 
will be reliable indicators of an adequate account of hap-
piness rather than fully fledged necessary conditions. (This 
is so because of the lower epistemological status of the 
new conditions.) 
(6) There is some continual iteration of (4) and (5) until a can-
didate is found which satisfies more of the necessary con-
ditions and reliable indicators than any other rival view. 
In order to appreciate the epistemological attractiveness of this 
approach, it will be instructive to consider the following passage: 
When some object that what everything aims at is 
not good, surely there is nothing in what they say. 
For if things seem good to all, we say they are good; 
and if someone undermines confidence in these, 
what he says will hardly inspire more confidence 
in other things. For if only beings without under-
standing desired these things, there would be some-
thing in the objection; but if intelligent beings also 
desire them, how can there be anything in it? (NE 
10, 1172b35 - 1173a2 emphasis mine). 
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This passage highlights several features of interest: 
(i) The fact that all intelligent beings have the same opin-
ions is some reliable yardstick by which to measure 
truth. 
(ii) If all agree that something appears to be good, we are 
justified in inferring that something is good. For 
Aristotle, then, total agreement about intersubjective 
appearances legitimates inferences about objectivity 
or truth (a very Kantian insight). 
(iii) That which everyone believes to be true has more 
credibility than that which no-one believes to be so. 
If we deny that the fact that there is widespread agree-
ment about certain beliefs has any bearing on truth, 
whatever other bench mark is to be introduced will 
have less credibility attached to it. A huge burden of 
proof falls on those who maintain such beliefs are no 
reliable measure of truth. 
(i v) Because our descriptions of things are inspired by the 
way things seem to us and, because total agreement 
about the way things seem allows us to infer that those 
descriptions accurately describe the way things are, 
our ordinary language contains a wealth of ontologi-
cal insights. Thus mining ordinary language for in-
sights can also be a particularly reliable source of data. 
(v) From (ii) and (iv), we can see that using the data of 
common opinions which enjoy complete unanimity 
and using data about the way we use ordinary lan-
guage are two highly reliable sources. These two 
sources have a strong claim to being authoritative, 
for Aristotle. 
We can now appreciate why the onion approach is epistemo-
logically attractive. The core requirements are derived by consid-
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ering various proposals and rejecting or accepting aspects of them 
on the basis of ordinary language usage and very widely shared 
other common beliefs. As was concluded in (v), the results of this 
sorting procedure will occupy a privileged epistemic status. The 
analysis gives rise to a minimal set of requirements or necessary 
conditions which an adequate account must fulfill. These provide 
the anchor or core of the account. After the core requirements (in-
cluding the first principle) have been established, through the ex-
amination of further data, other Mayers' of insights can be added to 
the view on a coherence basis. In these analyses he is far more 
dependent on his own intuitions in discerning truth. This is quite 
permissible, since once the account has been firmly rooted by the 
core, one need worry only about consistency in adding the layers. 
I turn now to consider in more detail the onion approach to 
developing a view on the nature of the ultimate good, eudaimonia. 
I shall first consider the necessary conditions which constitute the 
privileged epistemic position of the core. 
The core 
There are two distinct sources of input which are drawn upon 
to arrive at the first principle, namely, common opinions and meta-
physical views. (Aristotle acknowledges that we have a first prin-
ciple only after he discusses both categories - see NE 1098b.) I 
turn now to consider the input from the two sources in turn. 
1. Canvassing from common opinion 
In this category the argument proceeds dialectically. Aristotle 
examines some opinions about the best life and the highest good 
but rejects or accepts them on the basis of other very widely held 
popular opinions (shared by both the intelligent and the vulgar) 
and ways in which we use ordinary language. 
He deals first with the opinion that the best life consists in the 
life of gratification. This proposal is rejected on the grounds that 
such a life is insufficiently free. (When the reason is given it is 
unclear whether what is wrong with this life is that it fails to ex-
press freedom, or whether it is inadequate because it is not the 
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result of a free choice, or both, but let us ignore this ambiguity.) 
Furthermore, such a life dedicated to gratification of pleasures is 
not fitting for a human life but rather for brutes (NE 1095M9-22). 
Next up for consideration is the life of honor. Such a life is rejected 
on the basis that it is too superficial, too dependent on others and 
thus not sufficiently intrinsic to the person. Moreover, such a life 
would not accord well with our widely shared intuition that the 
good is "something of our own and hard to take from someone" 
(NE 1095b25). It appears, furthermore, that those who pursue honor 
aim to be honored by intelligent people explicitly for their virtue. 
But mere possession of the state of virtue alone is insufficient, for 
someone could possess virtue but be inactive his whole life or suf-
fer horrendous misfortune, and such a life would not be deemed 
happy by anyone. Thus mere possession of virtue without any ex-
ercise of that virtue is rejected because happiness has to be an ac-
tivity. The moneymaker's life is rejected on the grounds that it is 
not chosen for itself but rather as a means to something further. 
Such a life is chosen for the sake of something else and the good 
we are seeking is believed to be choiceworthy in itself. 
In dismissing the life of the money-maker, significant issues 
are introduced and these call for closer inspection. The discussion 
resumes at NE 1097a24 (after a brief detour through a discussion 
of why the form of the good cannot be a serious contender in the 
search for the best life). The good is said to be that for the sake of 
which all other things are done, but then he leaves it open how 
many of these there can be: "And so, if there is some end of every-
thing that is pursued in action, this will be the good pursued in 
action" (NE 10927a22-24). Aristotle then seems to leave the door 
open for the possibility of there being more than one good which is 
aimed at. 
This talk of aiming at ends leads Aristotle to a discussion of 
comparative "completeness": an end pursued in itself is said to be 
more complete than an end pursued for something else. Thus we 
get the notion of degrees of completeness. The notion of uncondi-
tional completeness would mean that such an end is always 
choiceworthy in itself and never for some other end. Now if only 
one end is complete, that will be the good, and if more than one 
end is complete, the most complete end will be the good. Happi-
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ness is always chosen for itself: no one ever chooses happiness for 
anything else. 
The complete good seems to be self-sufficient. "We regard 
something as self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life 
choiceworthy and lacking nothing; and that is what we think hap-
piness does" (NE 1097bl5). We do not believe that any addition 
can make happiness more choiceworthy. This is so because happi-
ness is not one good among many. 
Before going on to consider the next source of input, I shall 
summarize the requirements found to be necessary for identifying 
happiness. Taken in the order in which a criterion was discovered 
rather than any order signifying degrees of importance, canvass-
ing common opinion the following information is revealed about 
happiness: 
(R1) The happy life must express freedom. 
(R2) It must be fitting for a human. 
(R3) The good which is happiness is not superficial. 
(R4) The good is something we intuitively believe is hard 
to take from someone. 
(R5) The good implies an activity not simply the posses-
sion of a capacity or state. 
(R6) External goods such as good fortune seem in some 
way to be relevant to happiness. 
(R7) No-one chooses happiness for anything other than it-
self— it is intrinsically desirable. 
(R8) The good (or goods if there is more than one), is that 
for the sake of which other things are done. 
(R9) The good is the most complete end. 
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(R10) The good is most choiceworthy. There is nothing which 
can be added to the good which will make it more 
choiceworthy. 
(R11) The good is self-sufficient, that is, all by itself it makes 
a life most choiceworthy. 
One comment is worth making before proceeding: (R4) and 
(R6) might appear to be incompatible — this prima facie incom-
patibility will be resolved further on. 
2. Input from metaphysical commitments 
Happiness is to be identified with the proper and special func-
tion of humans (NE I,7,1097b22-1098a3). Human beings' distinc-
tive nature is now of concern to the inquiry. The argument at NE 
l,7,1098al3-18 proceeds as follows: 
(PI) If something has a function, then the good for that thing 
depends on that function. 
(P2) Humans have the special function of some sort of life 
of action of the part of the soul which expresses or 
requires reason (NE l,1098a2-4). 
(P3) Each function is completed well when its completion 
expresses the proper virtue (NE 1,1098a 15-16). 
Therefore, the human good is the soul's activity that ex-
presses virtue (NE l,1098al6-17). 
He continues the argument at NE 1, 1098al3-18, The human 
good is supposed to be an activity of the soul in accordance with 
virtue and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the 
best and most complete virtue in a complete life (NE l,1098al3-
18). This sets the stage for a search for the best and most complete 
virtue. 
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From these arguments we can add the following requirements 
to the list: 2 
(R12) Happiness is the soul's activity that expresses virtue 
and if there is more than one virtue, the good will ex-
press the best and most complete virtue. 
(R13) It is to be found in a complete life. 
(R14) It realizes some distinctive element in human nature. 
(R15) The virtue of a human being will be that state which 
makes him perform his function well. 
((R12) is considered by Aristotle to constitute a first principle, 
but as my analysis suggests, it is simply another necessary condi-
tion in the set of necessary conditions.) 
Armed with the list of requirements collected so far, Aristotle 
can begin with the next phase: Testing the core view as so far de-
veloped against new data. (Just to make it clear, (R1)-(R15) con-
stitute the core of his view on happiness. Any adequate account of 
happiness must embrace at least these requirements.) 
Testing by examining new data 
1. There is a common classification of goods into three types: 
external goods, goods of the soul and goods of the body. 
Goods of the soul are commonly recognized as the most 
valuable. The account thusfar arrived at preserves this view 
i.e. this datum is compatible with (R1) through (R15), and 
more particularly with (R12). 
2 Why is the definition of happiness just another necessary condition? The defi-
nition of happiness is a statement about the nature of happiness which all agree is 
the case, and that is a necessary and sufficient condition for its being a necessary 
condition of an adequate account of happiness. So, though Aristotle considers the 
definition of happiness to be a first principle, as I have set things up in this paper, 
it is just one among several necessary conditions which have the same status he 
accords his first principle. 
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2. The view accords with the belief that the end is a sort of 
living well and doing well in action. 
3. "... all the features that people look for in happiness ap-
pear to be true of the end described in our account" (NE 
1098b22) it is claimed: 
3a. The account agrees with those who maintain that 
happiness is activity expressing a particular vir-
tue. It is activity which is of the highest worth, 
rather than simply possessing a state. The prizes 
are not awarded in the Olympics for simply look-
ing strong but actually demonstrating in activity 
that strength better than the competition. 
3b. The life of the happy man will also be pleasant 
(NE 1,1099a7). But the pleasure is not something 
extra and in addition to the life of virtue, rather 
that pleasure is intrinsic to that life because ac-
tions expressing the virtues are pleasant in them-
selves. Happiness is said to be the "best, finest and 
most pleasant" thing in the world. (The excellent 
person who has good judgement agrees with these 
conclusions (NE 1099a23-25) and so this becomes 
a highly reliable indicator of the good life.) 
3c. Happiness requires external goods because certain 
resources will be required in order to perform vir-
tuous actions. Happiness also depends to some ex-
tent on a certain amount of good fortune: having 
good birth, good children, friends and beauty. But 
if happiness depended too heavily on external 
goods, a person's happiness could fluctuate errati-
cally and this does not accord with our intuition 
that happiness is enduring and not prone to fluc-
tuation. Although a modicum of these external 
goods might be necessary, it is virtue which is the 
controlling element:".... it is the activities express-
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ing virtue that control happiness, and the contrary 
activities that control its contrary" (NE 1100b9-
11). No other human activity has the same perma-
nence as virtuous activity. The best virtues will be 
the ones we can devote ourselves to more fully 
and continually (NE 1100bl5-17). 
From this testing step, a few more criteria must be added to 
our list as highly reliable indicators. Some of these are highly reli-
able indicators if not fully fledged necessary conditions because 
they are thought to be important by excellent people, but not all 
people. 
(116) Happiness will be some good of the soul. 
(117) Happiness is a sort of living well and doing well in 
action. 
(118) It is most pleasant. 
(119) Happiness should not depend too heavily on external 
goods. 
(120) Virtue is the controlling element of happiness. 
(121) Happiness will consist in those activities we can en-
gage in most fully and continuously. 
The initial testing phase having turned out well, we need to go 
on to develop the view more fully, that is, we need to look for the 
single virtue which is best and most complete. (Aristotle seems to 
be abandoning the model earlier hinted at as a possibility of happi-
ness as consisting of a number of virtues.) The hunt is on for the 
best and most complete virtue. We know what the criterion for 
most complete is, but Aristotle has not yet explicitly discussed the 
criterion forjudging the best virtue. 
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Searching for the best and most complete virtue 
With our work clearly set out for us, it is with enthusiasm that 
we might turn to books two through nine in search of the best and 
most complete virtue. But Aristotle does not talk in terms of the 
best and most complete virtue again until book ten. In book six he 
does compare some virtues of thought. Wisdom is clearly thought 
to be better than intelligence. At NE 1141a20-28 we get several 
arguments as to why intelligence is inferior to wisdom. 
(1) The most excellent science must be of the best things. 
Human beings are not the best things in the universe. 
Therefore, the most excellent science is not the science 
of (the good for) man. 
(2) The objects of knowledge involved in wisdom are by 
necessity eternally true whereas the objects of knowl-
edge involved in intelligence are only contingently true. 
The science which is engaged in discovering eternal 
truths is superior to the science concerned with mere 
relativized or contingent truths. Therefore, wisdom is 
superior to intelligence. 
(3) Some beasts can be said to have intelligence. No beasts 
can be said to have wisdom. What we share with beasts 
is of lesser value than what is distinctive of humans. 
Therefore, wisdom is superior to intelligence. 
Further down at 1141 bl-4 we get another argument along similar 
lines. 
(4) Wisdom is concerned with what is by nature most hon-
orable. What is concerned with what is by nature most 
honorable is better than what is concerned with things 
not as honorable. Therefore, wisdom is better than in-
telligence. 
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From this set of arguments it might seem that we have found 
our best virtue of thought, namely wisdom, but we are not yet in a 
position to know this since we still have not been given an explicit 
criterion for judging the best virtue. I turn now to consider the 
discussion in book ten to see what help it can give in our search for 
the best virtue. 
At NE 1176a33, Aristotle gives us what purports to be a reca-
pitulation of his former findings about happiness. The first three 
features of happiness are indeed a recap from previous findings: 
Happiness is not a state, but rather an activity. 
Happiness is most choiceworthy. 
Happiness is most self-sufficient. 
But after these three features are discussed we turn to what 
appears to be very different material. Aristotle considers the popu-
lar suggestion that happiness is a state of amusement because it 
appears that many people with supreme power spend their leisure 
time on amusements. Aristotle then supplies a battery of arguments 
against this suggestion. Methodologically, what is going on here is 
that the view developed thusfar is tested against new data. Although 
the new data fails to pass the relevant tests, it reveals a new layer 
of insights to add to "the onion" which has thusfar emerged. I turn 
then to consider Aristotle's reasons for rejecting the new datum: 
(1) Amusement causes more harm than benefit because 
amusement causes neglect of our bodies and posses-
sions. 
(2) What people who hold supreme power do does not 
constitute good evidence for what is best. Virtue and 
understanding, the sources of excellent activities are 
not dependent on having supreme power (NE 1176bl8). 
(3) These powerful people do not know pure and civilized 
pleasures and therefore they resort to bodily pleasures. 
Different things appear honorable to base and decent 
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people. Those things which are really honorable and 
pleasant are those things which appear so to the excel-
lent person. 
(4) It would be absurd if our lifelong efforts aimed at amus-
ing ourselves. Serious work aimed only at amusement 
is stupid and puerile. It seems correct to amuse our-
selves in order that we can do something serious and 
"it is because we cannot toil continuously that we re-
quire relaxation" (NE 1177b34-35). "The activity of 
what is better is superior, and thereby has more the 
character of happiness" (NE 1177a6-7). 
(5) Relaxation is good as a means or as preparation for 
activity. 
From the previous discussion it seems that Aristotle is sug-
gesting three more reliable indicators of the highest good: 
(122) The good must not cause more harm than benefit: it 
must not cause the neglect of our bodies and posses-
sions. 
(123) The pleasures to be experienced from happiness are of 
a pure and civilized type. 
(124) The good must be involved with serious matters. The 
character of happiness is more adequately captured by 
the pursuit of serious things. 
At NE 1177al0-12 Aristotle puts forward an argument for the 
highest good: 
P1. "If happiness is activity expressing virtue, it is reason-
able for it to express the supreme virtue, which will be 
the virtue of the best things" (NE 1177al0-12). 
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P2. The best thing (in us) is understanding, since the ob-
jects of understanding are the supreme objects of 
knowledge (NE 1177a20). 
P3. The virtue associated with understanding is the activ-
ity of study. 
Therefore, the activity of theoretical study constitutes com-
plete happiness. 
It is here that Aristotle's criterion forjudging the best virtue is 
revealed: the best virtue (for humans) will correspond to the best 
element in human beings. Then Aristotle cites a list of reasons why 
the activity of theoretical study is best. Some of these reasons sat-
isfy requirements (necessary conditions) originally laid down and 
others satisfy reliable indicators rather than actual requirements. 
Some of these reasons are completely new: 
a) We can engage in theoretical study most continuously, 
that is, it satisfies (121). Theoretical study is the most 
continuous activity, "since we are more capable of 
continuous study than any continuous action" (117a20). 
b) It is most pleasant, so it satisfies (118). Moreover, phi-
losophy is said to have remarkably pure and firm plea-
sures, so it satisfies (123) too. 
c) It is most self-sufficient. It might appear that the ac-
tivity of theoretical study satisfies (R11). On closer 
inspection, however, it appears that the meaning of the 
concept "self-sufficient" here has shifted quite remark-
ably from its meaning in (R11). Formerly, self-suffi-
ciency was described differently: "we regard some-
thing as self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a 
life choiceworthy and lacking nothing" (NE 1097bl5). 
Now self-sufficiency seems to mean that the activity 
can be done without the need for other people (although 
he concedes perhaps this can be done better with oth-
ers). Thus this notion of self-sufficiency introduces a 
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new reliable indicator rather than the activity of theo-
retical study satisfying an old one. 
d) It aims at no end beyond itself. Study is said to be 
intrinsically desired because of itself alone, since it 
has no result beyond having studied. He says: "But 
from the virtues concerned with action we try to a 
greater or lesser extent to gain something beyond the 
action itself (NE 1177b 1-4). Now it is not clear what 
sorts of things he has in mind when he says we try to 
gain something beyond the action itself. In other places 
he is explicit that we should do actions for their own 
sakes to be doing them virtuously (e.g., NE 1105a32-
33) so it is not obvious what we are trying to gain be-
yond the action itself. Perhaps he means that when we 
do virtuous practical activities, in addition to doing 
things for their own sakes, we also attempt to accom-
plish something by doing them in the sense that we 
wish to succeed in bringing about some change to some 
state of affairs. In the activity of theoretical study such 
attempts at success are no part of the process, at least 
not in the same sense. 
e) It involves leisure. Here is a new criterion altogether. 
By "leisure" it seems what is meant is "peace-time," 
i.e.. a condition of not being at war with other nations. 
It is said that the virtues concerned with action require 
war, trouble or politics in order to manifest themselves. 
Those actions expressing virtues in war are fine but 
they require trouble, they are not only intrinsically but 
also instrumentally desirable, since they aim at some 
end beyond the action itself. These actions are thus 
choiceworthy for some end other than themselves and 
so are not most choiceworthy. The activity of theoreti-
cal study by contrast aims at no end beyond itself. It 
has its own proper pleasure which encourages the ac-
tivity, for no end other than engaging in that activity. 
It thus satisfies (R7), (R8), (R9) and (RIO). Satisfying 
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(R7) through (RIO), where the life of practical activ-
ity expressing the virtues of character and intelligence 
fails, is an important finding in this investigation. Re-
quirements (R7) - (RIO) are part of the "core", i.e., 
these are necessary conditions for a minimally adequate 
account of the nature of happiness. The fact that the 
life of theoretical activity satisfies them is a huge da-
tum in favor of its giving the preferable account of the 
nature of happiness. 
It is a god-like life. This might seem to be a new twist 
to the story told thusfar. 
"Such a life would be superior to the human level. For 
someone will live it not in so far as he is a human 
being, but in so far as he has some divine element in 
him. And the activity of this divine element is as much 
superior to the compound. Hence if understanding is 
something divine in comparison with a human being, 
so also will the life that expresses understanding be 
divine in comparison with human life." (NE 1177b26-
32). 
One might have the following worry: Before this, the 
focus was on establishing what a specifically human 
life would look like — what sort of life would be most 
suitable for humans. It now appears that such an in-
vestigation misses the mark and what we ought to be 
investigating is what sort of life would be proper for 
some divine being. But this worry can be allayed fairly 
easily. It is indeed a necessary condition that the high-
est good must establish what sort of life would be most 
suitable for humans. However, what we have found is 
that the best sort of life for humans has some aspects 
to it which overlap partially with the best sort of life 
for the gods. The reason for this partial overlap is that 
humans have a divine element "in" them. The happy 
life is not required to resemble a god-like life uncon-
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ditionally. Rather, in so far as our characteristic activ-
ity will correspond to the best thing in us, and, in those 
respects in which the best thing in us is god-like, our 
lives will be god-like in those respects. 
h) It realizes the supreme element in human nature. We 
have been enjoined to search for the best and most 
complete virtue. We have been informed that the best 
virtue will correspond to the best part in us, so this 
should be no revelation at this stage. 
From this discussion a few more reliable indicators are suggested: 
(125) The best virtue (for humans) will correspond to the 
supreme element in humans. 
(126) The highest good or best activity constituting happi-
ness will be self-sufficient2, not in the sense articu-
lated in (R11), but rather in the sense that this activity 
can be done without needing other people. 
(127) The highest good aims at no end beyond itself. 
(128) The highest good will require peace-time or leisure. 
(129) The highest good will (in some respects) emulate a 
god-like life. 
The benefits of understanding Aristotle's strategy in these terms 
We are now in a position to address the notoriously difficult 
problem of reconciling the apparently distinct accounts of the na-
ture of happiness to be found in NE. 3 Space does not allow me to 
3 For more on this problem see, for instance, Kathleen Wilkes, "The Good Man 
and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics", Mind87 (1978), 553-571; J. L. Ackrill, 
"Aristotle on Eudaimonia," the Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy which ap-
peared in the Proceedings of the British Academy, October 1974; Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty, "The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics" Mind 87 
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rehearse too many details of the problem, but the basic point, at 
any rate, can be simply put. Aristotle gives two distinct and incom-
patible accounts of the nature of happiness in NE. In the earlier 
part of NE (especially book IV) he tells us that a happy life is one 
spent engaging in practical activity in accordance with virtues of 
character and intelligence. However, in book X he tells us that a 
happy life is one spent engaging in the activity of theoretical study 
(quite different from a life of practical activity in accordance with 
intelligence, since, for one thing, the objects of theoretical study 
are entirely different). As Aristotle describes them, the two kinds 
of lives are mutually exclusive, for several reasons including, for 
instance, that the life spent engaging in theoretical contemplation 
is one spent quite apart from others in a way that the life embrac-
ing practical virtues cannot be. 
Of course, one can try to redescribe the two lives so that they 
can be made compatible, 4 but these attempts will all have the wor-
risome problem of departing from Aristotle's actual text a fair bit. 
As I argue next, if we are to look solely at which account satisfies 
more of the necessary conditions and reliable indicators, a clear 
winner between these rival views emerges. (Although it will be 
more important to satisfy necessary conditions rather than reliable 
indicators and the satisfying of the former should be weighted more 
heavily than the satisfying of the latter, such added complexity is 
not necessary since, as will be seen, the competition is not even 
close.) This procedure of seeing which account satisfies most of 
the relevant criteria seems to be particularly reliable, since the 
meeting of criteria which Aristotle himself has set up, gets Aristotle's 
explicit endorsement. We will thus see that on Aristotle's own terms 
the life of theoretical study wins hands down. 
I have presented a summary of the results of this investigation 
in the table below. As can be seen from the table, the life of theo-
(1978), 343-358; Thomas Nagel, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia" originally published 
in Phmnesis 17 (1972), 252-259; Anthony Kenny, "Happiness", Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, 66 (1965-66), 93-102. 
4 Such an approach is attempted by, for instance, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, in 
"The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics" Mind 87 (1978), 
343-358; and Kathleen Wilkes in "The Good Man and the Good for Man in 
Aristotle's Ethics", Mind 87 (1978), 553-571. 
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retical study appears to meet a vastly greater number of criteria 
than its chief competitor, namely, the life of practical activity in 
accordance with virtues of character and intelligence. (Textual sup-
port is cited where reasons might ber equested. I have given the 
life in accordance with virtues of character and intelligence the 
benefit of the doubt where Aristotle is not clear.) 
Key: 
"F" stands for "fulfills the criterion" 
"NF" stands for "does not fulfill the criterion" 
Necessary Conditions and Reliable 
Indicator 
R I . S u c h a l i te e x p r e s s e s f r e e d o m / t r e e 
c h o i c e 
R 2 . S u c h a l i fe is Utt ing tor a h u m a n l ife 
R 3 . T h e h i g h e s t g o o d s h o u l d not be 
superf ic ia l 
R 4 . T h e g o o d is s o m e t h i n g w e in tu i t ive ly 
b e l i e v e is hard to take from s o m e o n e 
R 5 . T h e g o o d w i l l i n v o l v e an ac t iv i ty not 
s i m p l y the p o s s e s s i o n o f a state 
R 6 . External g o o d s s u c h as g o o d fortune 
s e e m in s o m e w a y to b e re levant to 
h a p p i n e s s 
R 7 . N o - o n e c h o o s e s h a p p i n e s s for any 
r e a s o n o t h e r than i tse l f - it is 
in tr ins ica l ly d e s i r a b l e 
R S . T h e g o o d is (hat for the s a k e o f w h i c h 
o t h e r t h i n g s are d o n e 
R 9 . T h e g o o d is the m o s t c o m p l e t e 
R I O . T h e g o o d is m o s t c h o i c e w o r t h y - there 
is n o t h i n g w h i c h can b e a d d e d to the 
g o o d w h i c h wi l l m a k e it m o r e 
c h o i c e w o r t h y 
R l I . T h e g o o d is s e l f - su f f i c i en t - it m a k e s a 
l i fe m o s t c h o i c e w o r t h y 
R I 2 . H a p p i n e s s is the s o u l ' s ac t iv i ty that 
e x p r e s s e s v ir tue a n d if there is m o r e 
than o n e . the b e s t a n d m o s t c o m p l e t e 
R I 3 . H a p p i n e s s is t o b e found in a c o m p l e t e 
l i fe 
R I 4 . T h e h i g h e s t g o o d r e a l i z e s s o m e 
d i s t i n c t i v e e l e m e n t in h u m a n nature 
R 1 5 . T h e v ir tue o f a h u m a n b e i n g w i l l be 
that state w h i c h m a k e s h i m p e r f o r m h i s 
f u n c t i o n w e l l 
Happiness = A Life 
of Theoretical Studv 
F: I I 7 8 ; I 5 - 8 
F: 1 1 7 7 a 15 
F: H 7 8 a 2 
F: 1 1 7 7 a 15 
F: H 7 8 a 2 4 - 2 5 
F: H 7 7 b l - 2 
F: H 7 7 b 2 0 - 2 I 
F: 1 1 7 7 b 2 4 - 2 5 
F: 1 l 7 7 b l - 2 
F: I 1 7 7 b l 8 - 2 I 
F: I l 7 7 a l ( ) - 1 9 & 
U 7 7 b l - 2 
F: I I 7 7 b 2 5 
F: I l 7 8 a 2 - I ( ) 
F: 1 1 7 8 a 5 - 8 
Happiness = A Life 
Where Virtues of 
Character and 
Intelligence are Best 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
N F : 1 1 7 7 b I -4 
N F : N o t a l w a y s 
M 7 7 b l 7 - l l 7 7 b l 8 
N F : 1 1 7 7 b I X & 1 1 7 7 b I - 4 
N F : I I 7 7 M 8 & H 7 7 b l - 4 
N F : I I 7 7 M 8 
N F : not bes t not m o s t 
c o m p l e t e s e e L H S 
F 
F 
F: I I 4 4 a 7 - I 0 
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116 . H a p p i n e s s w i l l be s o m e g o o d o f the F: 1 1 7 8 a 5 - 8 
s o u l 
117. H a p p i n e s s is a sort o f l i v i n g w e l l und F 
d o i n g w e l l in ac t ion 
118 . It is m o s t p leasant F: I I 7 7 a 2 4 
119. H a p p i n e s s s h o u l d not d e p e n d t o o 
h e a v i l y o n ex terna l g o o d s 
F: T h i s requires ex terna l 
g o o d s l e s s than the o t h e r 
l i fe & t h e s e c a n be a 
h indrance 
H 7 « a 2 4 - 2 5 
F 
F: I ! 7 7 a 2 2 - 2 3 
N F : N o t o b v i o u s h o w the 
2 n d part c a n be fu l f i l l ed 
120. Virtue is the c o n t r o l l i n g e l e m e n t o f 
h a p p i n e s s 
1 2 1 . H a p p i n e s s wi l l c o n s i s t in t h o s e 
a c t i v i t i e s w e c a n e n g a g e in m o s t ful ly 
and c o n t i n u o u s l y 
122. T h e g o o d must not c a u s e m o r e harm 
than benef i t : it mus t not c a u s e the 
n e g l e c t o f o u r b o d i e s and p o s s e s s i o n s 
123 . T h e p l e a s u r e s to be e x p e r i e n c e d from F: 1 1 7 7 a 2 5 - 2 6 
h a p p i n e s s are o f a pure a n d c i v i l i z e d 
t y p e 
124 . T h e g o o d must b e i n v o l v e d wi th F: 1 1 7 7 a 1 5 
s e r i o u s mat ters 
125. T h e best v irtue w i l l c o r r e s p o n d to the F: 117Xu2-8 
s u p r e m e e l e m e n t in h u m a n s 
126. A l i fe o f th i s ac t iv i ty is m o s t self- F: 1 1 7 7 a 2 5 - 3 5 
su f f i c i en t . - th i s ac t iv i ty c a n be d o n e 
w i t h o u t n e e d i n g o t h e r p e o p l e 
127 . T h e h i g h e s t g o o d a i m s at n o e n d F: I l 7 7 b l - 2 
b e y o n d i t se l f 
128. T h e h i g h e s t g o o d wi l l require p e a c e - F : l l 7 7 b 5 - 2 2 
t i m e o r le i sure 
129. T h e h i g h e s t g o o d w i l l in s o m e F: I l 7 7 b 2 6 - 3 3 
r e s p e c t s e m u l a t e a g o d - l i k e life 
N F : N o t m o s t p leasant : 
I l 7 7 a 2 4 
F: R e q u i r e s s o m e 
e x t e r n a l g o o d s to d o 
v i r t u o u s a c t i o n s 
H 7 8 b l - 3 
N F : I ! 7 7 a 2 2 - 2 3 
F: A d h e r e n c e to the 
m e a n w o u l d not a l l o w 
s u c h n e g l e c t 
F 
N F : 1178u2-X 
N F : I I 7 8 a 2 4 - I I 7 8 b 3 & 
I l 7 8 a l l - I 4 
N F : 1 l 7 7 b 2 - 4 
N F : l l 7 7 b 5 - 2 2 
N F : I l 7 8 a 8 - I 4 
It appears then that the life spent engaging in the activity of 
theoretical study meets just about all the requirements and reliable 
indicators Aristotle demands of an adequate account. 
The life spent engaging in the activity of theoretical study meets 
all fifteen of the necessary conditions which an adequate account 
of happiness must satisfy. Moreover, it satisfies almost all the reli-
able indicators too (thirteen of the fourteen). There is only one that 
it does not appear to meet and that is (122). How will a life of 
theoretical study preclude the possibility that we will neglect our 
bodies and possessions? (Perhaps there is some way in which the 
highest good can satisfy this requirement although it is not obvi-
ous.) By contrast, the life of activity in accordance with virtues of 
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character and intelligence does not satisfy six of the fifteen neces-
sary conditions an adequate account of the nature of happiness 
should satisfy to be minimally adequate and does not satisfy seven 
of the fourteen reliable indicators. A clear choice has thus emerged: 
the life of theoretical study is the happy life, according to Aristotle. 
The big picture once again: summary of the paper's findings 
In this paper I examined the method Aristotle employed in in-
vestigating the nature of happiness in NE. I discerned a pattern to 
the inquiry which I baptized "the onion approach to developing 
and fleshing out a view". Material for the core was derived from 
considering some proposals and using ordinary language usage and 
those common opinions which enjoy unanimity as an appropriate 
yardstick for sorting those aspects which are true from those which 
are not. (I discussed why these two sources are to be trusted.) Ma-
terial was also garnered from certain metaphysical views. Through 
careful exegesis of this material, a set of requirements (necessary 
conditions) was derived which any adequate account of the nature 
of happiness should satisfy. These necessary conditions constitute 
the core. Through constant testing of the view developed against 
fresh data, new insights about happiness are extracted. These in-
sights were converted into reliable indicators and they were added 
to the list of criteria which any adequate account must attempt to 
satisfy. Thus we saw how the onion got its layers, as layers of in-
sights were revealed through testing new data against the view. 
Having collected a good set of criteria by which to judge an 
adequate account of the highest good, we were then in a position to 
address the notorious problem that Aristotle appears to endorse 
two incompatible lives as happy. When we tested the hypothesis 
that happiness consists in a life engaging in the activity of theoreti-
cal study against the criteria already established, we saw that the 
hypothesis satisfied nearly all the criteria it should and certainly 
all the necessary ones. By contrast, the chief rival hypothesis, 
namely the life spent engaging in practical activity in accordance 
with virtues of character and intelligence, fared miserably when 
evaluated in terms of the same set of criteria. Since these are the 
criteria Aristotle himself demanded of an adequate view, we can 
106 AUSLEGUNG 
5 I am very grateful to Michael Ferejohn for comments on this paper, and for 
his offering a course on the Nicomachean Ethics to accommodate my interest in 
studying this text in detail. 
conclude that Aristotle himself endorsed the hypothesis that hap-
piness consists in a life engaging in the activity of theoretical study.5 
